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I. Introduction
Since the late 1980s and the end of the Cold War, the negotiation of regional trade
agreements (RTAs) has become one of the favorite pastimes of economists, policymakers,
and international lawyers throughout the Western Hemisphere.' The rationale behind
such organizations is understandable. Founded on the theory of comparative advan-
tage, which pervades arguments in favor of RTAs, "if each country sticks to what it
does best ... and imports everything else it needs, everyone will be better off."2 In gen-
eral, governments acceding to RTAs reduce or eliminate tariffs and quotas among the
The author, a member of the Maryland and District of Columbia Bars, holds a B.A. in
political science from Saint Mary's College of Maryland, an M.A. in International Affairs
from The Elliott School of International Affairs at The George Washington University, and a
J.D. from The University of Baltimore School of Law. He currently is pursuing an LL.M. in
International and Comparative Law at The Georgetown University Law Center.
I. DUNCAN GREEN, SILENT REVOLUTION: THE RISE OF MARKET ECONOMICS IN LATIN AMERICA
141 (1995). Mr. Green asserts: "Everybody's doing it." Id. As Mr. Green points out, by the
mid-1990s, Latin American states were involved with at least twenty-two bilateral accords
and sub-regional pacts. Id. These regional agreements take the form of either preferential
arrangements (e.g., the Andean Trade Preference Act, the Caribbean Basin Initiative), recipro-
cal arrangements (e.g., Latin American Integration Association), free trade agreements (e.g.,
NAFTA), or common markets (e.g., Andean Pact, Caribbean Community, MERCOSUR). See
Nora Lustig & C.A. Primo Braga, The Future of Trade Policy in Latin America, in INTEGRATING
THE AMERICAS: SHAPING FUTURE TRADE POLICY 31-38 (Sidney Weintraub ed., 1994).
2. GREEN, supra note 1, at 141.
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signatories, and may eventually lead to a customs union and free trade area. In the for-
mer, tariffs and quotas among the member states are reduced or eliminated; a common
external tariff is charged to parties outside of the agreement region, labor and capital
move about more freely, and, in some instances, as in the European Union, a common
currency is utilized.3 A free trade area is a system in which, as in a customs union, mem-
bers reduce or abolish quantitative restrictions and tariffs on imports between the party
states. Individually, however, the party states may maintain such protective measures
against nonassociated countries (i.e., no common external tariff).4
Beyond these lofty, liberal notions of freer trade, harmonization, and commonality,
economic realism appears to have become the true driving force behind RTAs in the
3. Id. Of course, regional trade agreements in the Americas did not emerge only at the dawn of
the 1990s. "The integration or union of several countries is not a new concept in Latin Amer-
ica. After the various countries achieved independence, attempts were made in this direction,
although mainly politically motivated." VICTOR L. URQUIDI, FREE TRADE AND ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION IN LATIN AMERICA 20 (Marjory M. Urquidi trans., 1964). Before, during, and
after World War II, blocs were considered throughout the Americas either on a regional or
pan-American basis. Id. at 20-21.
While not of direct concern to this paper, the author would be remiss to neglect the dynamic
between the development of RTAs and member state obligations under the World Trade Orga-
nization (WTO). On their face, most RTAs violate the nondiscrimination principles of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), because these arrangements allow members
of an RTA to afford better treatment to each other than to non-member states. An exception
to this rule has been carved out in GATT Article XXIV. See JOHN H. JACKSON ET' AL., DOC-
UMENTS SUPPLEMENT To LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 47-50
(3rd ed. 1995). Under Article XXIV, states are permitted to depart from the nondiscrimination
principle through the formation of either a customs union (CU) or free trade area (FTA).
Under Article XXIV(5)(a) and 5(b), respectively, members of a CU or FTA may not raise trade
barriers to non-parties higher than those existing at the creation of the RTA. See Robert Hudec
& James D. Southwick, Regionalism and WTO Rules: Problems in the Fine Art of Discriminat-
ing Fairly, in TRADE RULES IN THE MAKING: CHALLENGES IN REGIONAL AND MULTILATERAL
NEGOTIATIONS 50 (Miguel Rodriguez Mendoza et al. eds., 1999).
However, NAFTA, MERCOSUR, and most RTAs in force currently remain in a "legally
ambiguous situation.' Sergio Lopez-Ayllon, Beyond the Summit of the Americas II: Prospects
for FTAA and Future Western Hemisphere Integration, NAFTA: L. & Bus. REV. AM. 241, 246
(1999). Although NAFTA Articles 101 and 103 affirm its consistency with, and obligations
to, the GATT, ambiguity remains, in part, because of variations in sectoral breadth and treat-
ment relations between the GATT and NAFTA members.
In contrast, MERCOSUR documents "do not mention the GATT, or how the regional eco-
nomic arrangement relates to it." Cherie O'Neal Taylor, Dispute Resolution as a Catalyst for
Economic Integration and an Agent for Deepening Integration: NAFTA and MERCOSUR? 17
Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 850, 889 (1996-1997). In 1992, the states of MERCOSUR presented
the Treaty of Asunci6n before the GATT, to affirm its existence and compliance with GATT
rules. The Committee on Trade and Development affirmed MERCOSUR's status as an RTA
under the GATT rules of Article XXIV and section 2(c) of the "enabling clause," permitting
special treatment for developing countries. See Adrian Makuc, Multilateral Trading System
and Regional Integration, 13 FLA. J. INTL L. 59, 61 (2000); Regionalism: the Enabling Clause,
available at www.wto.orgenglish/tratop-e/region-e/regenb-e.htm
4. Jos6 Manuel Salazar-Xirinachs et al., Customs Unions, in TOWARD FREE TRADE IN THE AMER-
ICAS 45 (Jos Manuel Salazar-Xirinachs & Maryse Robert eds., 2001).
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Western Hemisphere after the demise of the Soviet Union, communism, and the bipo-
lar dynamic. Greater input of investment, whether regional, extra-regional, or national,
came to the fore as a fundamental concern for leaders, particularly in Latin America.
The "greatest concern that the end of the Cold War generated in Latin America was fun-
damentally economic. . . . The larger countries feared that private credit and investment
flows would be diverted ... to the new capitalism of Eastern Europe."5 Therefore, invest-
ment flow, and the disputes that can arise from this input were, and continue to be, of
great effect both to the nations of the Western Hemisphere on individual bases, as well
as to the overall survival of the various RTAs in existence. Two such RTAs, while nascent
during the Cold War, but solidified by the early and mid-1990s, are the Common Market
of the South (MERCOSUR) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 6
The purpose of this paper is to examine the investor-state dispute settlement mech-
anisms of the MERCOSUR and NAFTA systems.
First, this paper will provide brief, cursory histories of the creation and aspirations
of MERCOSUR and NAFTA. Part 2 will discuss and analyze the treaty provisions relevant
to investor-state dispute resolutions under these regimes. Finally, this paper will conclude
with the author's central argument that from the treaty provisions of MERCOSUR and
NAFTA, while both imperfect, the latter promotes a paradigm the former should attempt
to emulate. While the leaders of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay seek invest-
ment, internal political and financial strife may, at least to this author, provide a catalyst
for further withdrawal. A return to nationalism, greater attention to import-substitution
industrialization, and movement away from extra-regional trade will further dissuade
investment and promote further economic deterioration.
II. Historical Background
A. COMMON MARKET OF THE SOUTH
While efforts at regional economic integration are not a new phenomenon in Latin
America, early "incarnations were largely dysfunctional:' as was the case with the Latin
5. Jorge G. Castafieda, Latin America and the End of the Cold War: An Essay in Frustration, in
LATIN AMERICA IN A NEW WORLD 40 (Abraham F. Lowental & Gregory F. Treverton eds.,
1994). As one Argentine student is quoted as saying: "What role can Latin America play on
the global stage as the bipolar world comes to an end, and the Eastern bloc emerges as a
fabulous opportunity for investment, as the United States looks East and Europe looks East?"
Id. In the early and mid-1990s, President Salinas de Gortari of Mexico, and President Collor
de Mello of Brazil were strongly motivated by this fear of investment transfer from the South
to the former Warsaw Pact. Id. "Salinas, for example, justified his changed stance on a free
trade agreement with the United States, and his efforts to seek such an agreement precisely
because funding from Europe was no longer available as a result of the transformation of the
Eastern European economies?' Id.
6. Interestingly, while the conclusion of a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) "remains
elusive... bilateral and regional agreements... have proliferated in all regions of the world,
not only between developed and developing countries [e.g., NAFTA]... but now also
between developing countries [e.g. MERCOSUR]' Riyaz Dattu, A Journey from Havana to
Paris: The Fifty-Year Quest for the Elusive Multilateral Agreement on Investment, 24 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 275, 275 & 277 (2000).
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American Free Trade Association (LAFTA).' By the mid-1980s, however, the Southern
Cone8 experienced a sea change towards cooperation in a region beleaguered by military
dictatorship, protectionism, hyperinflation, and border disputes.9 In 1986, Argentina and
Brazil signed the Program for Integration and Economic Cooperation (PICE), an agree-
ment comprising of twenty-four sectors covering trade, most notably in capital goods,
automobiles, and wheat.1° Two years after PICE was enacted, the two giants signed a new
treaty aimed at creating a common market."' "This agreement between the two most
important countries in Latin America was the real catalyst which lead to the creation of
MERCOSUR."''
Hence, on 26 March 1991, the leaders of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay
signed the Treaty of Asunci6n, thereby setting forth a process to establish a "common
market in the Southern Cone" by the last day of December 1994.'3 By 1 January 1995,
"the fundamental elements of a common market were achieved" by MERCOSUR, in
that a common external tariff and reductions of internal tariffs were implemented. 14
The Treaty of Asunci6n and the inchoate MERCOSUR regime promulgated a system of
"flexibility and simplicity."15 Initially, the Member States of MERCOSUR "refrained from
7. SIDNEY WEINTRAUB, DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRACY IN THE SOUTHERN CONE: IMPERATIVES
FOR U.S. POLICY IN SOUTH AMERICA 2 (2000).
8. See G. POPE ATKINS, LATIN AMERICA IN THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SYSTEM 32-34 (3rd
ed. 1995). Mr. Atkins provides an interesting survey of the political international subsystems
present in South America, contrasting that of the Caribbean states (i.e., Colombia, Guyana,
Suriname, and Venezuela) and the Southern Cone (i.e., Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay).
9. Peter Coffey, The Historical Background to Integration in Latin America, in LATIN AMERICA-
MERCOSUR 4-6 (Peter Coffey ed., 1998).
10. Id. at 6.
11. Id.
12. Id. Mr. Coffey asserts that it was "both logical and simple" for Argentina and Brazil to
promote the common market integration scheme further by including Paraguay and Uruguay.
13. Treaty of Asunci6n, Mar. 26, 1991, art. 1, 30 I.L.M. 1041, 1044 0. Chile and Bolivia hold
associate member status in MERCOSUR. The former joined in 1996, the latter in 1997.
Salazar-Xirinachs et al., supra note 4, at 77.
The central goal of the MERCOSUR regime, member state integration, is to be achieved
through: (1) the free movement of goods, services, and factors of production by the elim-
ination of customs duties, non-tariff barriers, and other restrictive measures; (2) the estab-
lishment of a common external tariff, adoption of common policies in relationship to third
party states, and overall economic and commercial coordination; (3) macroeconomic and
sectoral policy coordination in areas such as foreign trade, agriculture, industry, fiscal and
monetary matters; foreign exchange and capital, services, customs, transport, and commu-
nications; and (4) overall legislative harmonization to further the integration process. See
Treaty of Asunci6n, supra note 13, at 1045; Jorge Lucdngeli, Argentina and the Challenge of
Mercosur, in LATIN AMERICA-MERCOSUR, supra note 9, at 22-23. Article 15 of the Treaty
of Asunci6n states that MERCOSUR headquarters is to be located in Montevideo, Uruguay.
Treaty of Asunci6n, supra note 13, at 1048.
14. Malcolm Rowat et al., Competition Policy and MERCOSUR, xviii World Bank Technical Paper
No. 385 (1997).
15. Miguel Rodriguez Mendoza, Dealing with Latin America's New Regionalism, in TRADE RULES
IN THE MAKING, supra note 3, at 84.
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creating supranational institutions to guide the process."' 6 Hence, at the institutional
level, the Treaty of Asunci6n itself is fairly shallow. The treaty established the Council
of the Common Market, the supreme organ of the common market, responsible for the
political leadership and the compliance decision-making of the organization, 7 as well as
the Common Market Group, the executive organ of MERCOSUR, which has the "powers
of initiative"'" and "oversees the implementation of the agreement."' 9
The MERCOSUR regime required much needed depth, both institutionally and
structurally. This was accomplished through the Protocol of Ouro Preto, signed on
17 December 1994.20 Under this Protocol, MERCOSUR achieved a further adjustment
aimed at greater integration into the world economy.2' MERCOSUR became endowed
with a legal status, empowering it to negotiate on an international level.22 Ouro Preto, in
addition to reaffirming the role of the Common Market Group and the Council, created
bodies including the MERCOSUR Trade Commission, the Joint Parliamentary Com-
mission, the Economic-Social Consultative Forum, and the MERCOSUR Administrative
16. Id.
17. The Treaty of Asunci6n, supra note 13, at arts. 9 & 10. The Council of the Common Market
is to consist of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the Ministers of Economy of the member
states. Id. art. 11.
18. Id. art. 13. The CMG is to monitor compliance with the Treaty of Asunci6n, enforce the
decision of the Council of the Common Market, and further ensure the liberalization and
overall functioning of MERCOSUR. Id. The CMG is to consist of four members and four
alternates for each member state representing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry
of Economy or its equivalent, and the Central Bank. Id. art. 14.
19. Salazar-Xirinachs, supra note 4, at 79. The Treaty of Asunci6n also contains five annexes.
Treaty of Asunci6n, supra note 13, at 1050-1061. In order, these annexes deal with trade
liberalization/tariff reduction, rules of origin, dispute settlement, safeguards, and working
groups. Id. Of specific concern to this paper is Annex III, dealing with dispute settlement.
The Treaty of Asunci6n calls for the settlement of disputes by direct negotiations, with CMG
and Council consultation if necessary. The members of MERCOSUR were to establish a
permanent system of dispute resolution by 31 December 1994, the birth of the common
market. Id. at 1059. This was accomplished to an extent on 17 December 1991 with the
Protocol of Brasilia for the Settlement of Disputes. Protocol of Brasilia for the Settlement
of Disputes, Dec. 17, 1991, 36 I.L.M. 691 [hereinafter Protocol of Brasilia]. The Protocol of
Brasilia, which went into effect in April 1993, deals only with disputes between MERCOSUR
states (government-to-government) and private parties and a MERCOSUR state (private-to-
government). Nadia de Araujo, Dispute Resolution in Mercosul: The Protocol of Las Lehias and
the Case Law of the Brazilian Supreme Court, 32 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 25, 36 (2001).
As will be mentioned further in Part II of this paper, the Protocol of Brasilia plays an integral
role in certain aspects of the MERCOSUR investment instruments, the Protocol of Colonia
and the Protocol of Buenos Aires.
As one writer points out: "The MERCOSUR has not yet established a permanent dispute
settlement system ... The Brasilia Protocol ... established a dispute settlement system that
was to remain in force until the permanent dispute system for the common market was set
up." Taylor, supra note 3, at 859-860; see Protocol of Ouro Preto, Dec. 17, 1994, art. 44, 34
I.L.M. 1244, 1257 [hereinafter Protocol of Ouro Preto].
20. Protocol of Ouro Preto, supra note 19, at 1258.
21. WEINTRAUB, supra note 7, at 9.
22. Coffey, supra note 9, at 11; Protocol of Ouro Preto, supra note 19, at art. 8(Il-IV).
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Secretariat. 23 The Council, the Common Market Group, and the MERCOSUR Trade
Commission are the three intergovernmental organs with decision-making authority.
2 4
Therefore by the end of 1994, at the dawn of the official genesis of MERCOSUR, the
governments of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay, had established the foundation
for a viable, functioning organization through the "key MERCOSUR agreements" of the
Treaty of Asunci6n and the Protocol of Ouro Preto.2" While a "complete customs union"
was not achieved by 1995, a common external tariff was implemented, while most other
tariffs had been eliminated by the end of 1994.26
In recent years, MERCOSUR, "gradually moving towards becoming completely oper-
ational as a full free trade area' 27 has been successful, despite recent economic and
23. Protocol of Ouro Preto, supra note 19, art. 1.
24. Salazar-Xirinachs, supra note 4, at 79; Protocol of Ouro Preto, supra note 19, art. 2. The
Protocol of Ouro Preto further defined the roles of the Council and the CMG. Article 8 of
the Protocol details the duties and functions of the Council. Its main purpose is to promote
the development of the common market and to act of behalf of MERCOSUR in international
settings. As the supreme body of MERCOSUR, decisions of the Council are binding on all
member states, under Article 9 of the Protocol. Id. art. 9.
The CMG acts on behalf of the Council's mandate. Its purpose is threefold: (1) to ensure
that the Treaty of Asunci6n and all its ancillary protocols and agreements are respected by
the member states; (2) to ensure progress towards a common market through the creation
of work programs; and (3) to negotiate, at the Council's direction, with member countries,
third countries, and international institutions. Protocol of Ouro Preto, supra note 19, art. 14.
The decisions of the CMG called Resolutions are binding on all member states. Id. art 15.
See also Salazar-Xirinachs, supra note 4, at 80.
The newly created MERCOSUR Trade Commission is to monitor the application of the
common trade policy instruments of MERCOSUR in the overall operation and functioning
of the common market. Protocol of Ouro Preto, supra note 19, arts. 16 & 19. Directives of
the MTC are binding on all the member states. Id. art. 20.
It must be pointed out that the "binding" decisions of the Council, CMG, and MTC must
be ratified and incorporated into the domestic legal system of each state. Id. arts. 38-40.
"None of the MERCOSUR countries are monist states-states which allow international law
to be incorporated without the need for domestic legislative action." Taylor, supra note 3, at
n.98.
December 1994 saw not only the strengthening and reaffirmation of the MERCOSUR sys-
tem through the Protocol, multiple decisions were approved by the member states at Ouro
Preto. These decisions included principles of global banking supervision, standardization of
information for the stock market, transportation of hazardous materials, agreement on trans-
portation system between the MERCOSUR states, application of customs norms, intellec-
tual property agreements, sugar sector rules, anti-competition distortion policies, a common
external tariff, harmonization of tariff criteria, and a common automotive regimen. MASAAKI
KOTABE, MERCOSUR AND BEYOND: THE IMMINENT EMERGENCE OF THE SOUTH AMERICAN
MARKETS 40-41 (1996).
25. WEINTRAUB, supra note 7, at 9.
26. Salazar-Xirinachs, supra note 4, at 82.
27. Latin America and the Caribbean in the World Economy, U.N. Economic Commission for Latin
America and the Caribbean 122 (1999). MERCOSUR "made significant progress toward a free
trade area in a brief period of time, and intraregional trade flows experienced a significant
rise." Roberto Bouzas, Regional Trade Arrangements: Lessons from Past Experiences, in TRADE
RULES IN THE MAKING, supra note 3, at 192.
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political crises.2" Evidence of this is the phenomenal increase in intra-regional trade and
input of foreign investment in the MERCOSUR states following its creation. 29 While the
economic performance of MERCOSUR has slumped in recent years, the overall achieve-
ments of this "integration scheme in the areas of trade, investment, and interaction
between the production structures of member countries have been substantial."3
B. NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
"The Parties to this Agreement... hereby establish a free trade area "'3 With these
words, the North American Free Trade Agreement between Canada, Mexico, and the
28. This has been most notable in the executive and monetary crises gripping Argentina. See
THE ECONOMIST, 12 Jan. 2002, at 13 & 34; Manuel Pastor & Carol Wise, From Poster Child
to Basket Case, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Nov. 1, 2001, at 60.
By 2000, MERCOSUR had established itself as "the third wealthiest regional trading orga-
nization in the world surpassed only by the European Union and NAFTA. Jorge Guira,
MERCOSUR: The Emergence of a Working System of Dispute Resolution, 6 NAFTA: L. & Bus.
REV. AM. 255, 255 (2000).
29. Total exports by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay grew from $34.8 billion in 1985 to
almost $75 billion in 1999. Karsten Steinfatt & Patricio Contreras, Trade and Investment Flows
in the Americas, in TOWARD FREE TRADE IN THE AMERICAS, supra note 4, at 22. Import data
also indicate "the high degree of interdependence among MERCOSUR member countries?'
Id. at 25. In 1999, 20 percent of total imports were intra-regional (intra-MERCOSUR), double
the amount from 1985. Id. This data reflects MERCOSUR's commitment to the promo-
tion of "economics of complementarity... based on their respective comparative advantage?'
KOTABE, supra note 24, at 27.
From 1990 to 1995, foreign direct investment from the European Union, Japan, and the
United States to MERCOSUR increased from $2.3 billion to $10.88 billion. FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT IN LATIN AMERICA: PERSPECTIVES OF THE MAJOR INVESTORS 271 (The Inter-
American Development Bank & The Institute for European-Latin American Relations, 1998).
However, overall inability to compete internationally, increased flows to Mexico, burgeoning
global economic malaise, as well as domestic woes, reflect a, hopefully, reversible drop in
overall FDI to MERCOSUR from 1999 to 2000. Argentina saw a drop of FDI from $23.5 bil-
lion to $11.9 billion; FDI to Brazil fell from $32.65 billion to $30.25 billion; FDI to Paraguay
interestingly increased from $95 million in 1999 to $100 million in 2000. This was a decrease,
however, from $196 million in 1998. Uruguay experienced a decrease from $229 million in
1999 to $180 million in 2000. Foreign Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean, U.N.
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 39 (2001).
30. Latin America and the Caribbean in the World Economy, supra note 27, at 121. The U.N. points
out further that under the MERCOSUR system, there has been an increase by civil society in
participation in the sub-regional integration process, and expanded links between municipal
and provincial leaders, professional, and labor organizations, and employers' associations. Id.
31. The North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, art. 101; 32 I.L.M. 289, 297
[hereinafter NAFTAI. NAFTA is the culmination of nearly a decade's progress towards the
"establishment of the first [preferential trade arrangement] between developed and developing
countries." Roberto Bouzas, supra note 27, at 187.
In 1985, Canada began to seek freer trade with her larger southern neighbor. Maryse
Robert, Free Trade Agreement, in TOWARD FREE TRADE IN THE AMERICAS, supra note 4, at
88. Eventually, on 1 January 1989, the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement entered into force
and eliminated trade barriers between the two countries, as well as loosening restrictions
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United States was born on 1 January 1994.32 Basically, the goal of NAFTA is to pro-
vide for the "progressive elimination of all tariffs and other barriers to trade on goods
qualifying as North American." 3 By 1 July 1997, Canada, Mexico, and the United States
implemented the first round of accelerated tariff elimination, 4 followed on 1 August
1998, with the implementation of a second round of further tariff reductions, covering
around $1 billion in trade. 3  Tariff elimination on a number of goods continued and
took effect on 1 January 2001.36 These eliminations will continue to occur for more
sensitive items, such as agricultural products and textiles, throughout the first decade of
this century.
3 7
in services and investment. Id. In 1986, Mexico joined GATT, and by 1990 approached the
United States in regards to free trade area negotiations. Id. at 89.
Both Canada and Mexico entered into negotiations for a free trade area with the United
States for varied reasons. Roberto Bouzas, supra note 27, at 188. For Canada, the dominant
objective was to guarantee more stable access to the U.S. market by limiting U.S. discretion
in the implementation of trade remedy laws, and by protecting Canadian exports from future
increases in U.S. protection. [As discussed earlier in this paper], Mexico was also interested
in increasing its attractiveness to foreign investors, as well as in buying credibility for, and
locking in, domestic reform policies." Id.
32. NAFTA, supra note 31, art. 2203. The actual NAFTA text "is a massive document of thousands
of pages. . . . Consequently, the agreement is not an easy read. NAFTA is sure to keep many
lawyers... gainfully occupied for years making interpretations that will have modest social
welfare benefits." Sidney Weintraub, The North American Free Trade Agreement as Negotiated:
A U.S. Perspective, in ASSESSING NAFTA: A TRINATIONAL ANALYSIS 1 (Steven Globerman &
Michael Walker, eds., 1993).
NAFTA is a dramatically more complex, integrated, and structured regime than MERCO-
SUR. To delve into NAFTA beyond a cursory fashion, would be venturing into an amount
of detail well beyond the scope of this paper. The aim of this paper is far more modest.
33. Robert, supra note 31, at 89. Under Article 102 of NAFTA:
The objectives of this Agreement, as elaborated more specifically through its principles and rules,
including national treatment, most-favored nation treatment, and transparency, are to: (a) eliminate
barriers to trade in, and facilitate the cross border movement of, goods and services between
the territories of the Parties; (b) promote conditions of fair competition in the free trade area;
(c) increase substantially investment opportunities in the territories of the Parties; (d) provide
adequate and effective protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights in each Party's
territory; (e) create effective procedures for the implementation and application of this Agreement,
for its joint administration and for the resolution of disputes; and (f) establish a framework for
further trilateral, regional, and multilateral cooperation to expand and enhance the benefits of this
Agreement.
NAFTA, supra note 31, art. 102.
34. Robert, supra note 31, at 89.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See Eric Barry & Elizabeth Siwicki, NAFTA: The Textile and Apparel Sector, in ASSESSING
NAFTA: A TRINATIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 32, at 145; Thomas Grennes, Toward a More
Open Agriculture in North America, in ASSESSING NAFTA: A TRINATIONAL ANALYSIS, supra
note 32, at 150.
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The "central institution"38 of NAFTA is the Free Trade Commission (FTC), which
supervises the implementation of the agreement, attempts to resolve disputes, oversees
the operation of all relevant committees and working groups, and aims to ensure the
overall functioning of the NAFTA system. 39 Ancillary to the FTC is the Secretariat, which
maintains an office in each member state4" and administers the dispute settlement pro-
visions under the chapters dealing with financial services, anti-dumping/countervailing
duties, and certain investment provisions.4' Additionally, each national section of the
Secretariat maintains a "'court-like' registry" relating to NAFTA proceedings and assists
the FTC when called upon to do so.
42
Currently, NAFTA is one of the most "closely integrated areas in the world, as
evidenced by the high level of trade among its three members.' 4 3 In 1999, intra-NAFTA
exports accounted for over 50 percent of total exports within the troika, up from 42
percent in 1986. 44 Imports from Canada and Mexico accounted for about 30 percent of
imports to the United States.45 In contrast, NAFTA imports accounted for 70 percent of
total imports to Canada and 75 percent of total imports to Mexico.46
Concerning investment, NAFTA has produced a significant impact on its members,
most dramatically in Mexico and its maquila manufacturing centers.4 7 In fact, between
1995 and 2000, more than 60 percent of overall foreign direct investment was aimed at
the Mexican manufacturing sectors, 48 with investment from the United States accounting
for over 65 percent of that total. 9
38. Robert, supra note 31, at 93.
39. NAFTA, supra note 31, art. 2001. The FTC is to be comprised of cabinet-level representatives
from Canada, Mexico, and the United States. Id. at art.' 2001(1). Key issues addressed by these
committees and working groups include trade in goods, rules of origin, customs, agricultural
trade and subsidies, investment, movement of business people, and government procurement.
Robert, supra note 31, at 94.
40. NAFTA, supra note 31, art. 2002.
41. Robert, supra note 31, at 94.
42. Id.
43. Steinfatt, supra note 29, at 27. It should be noted that while NAFTA is becoming more
entrenched within the trade framework of its three members, it pales in its integration level
compared to the European Union. Unlike the EU, the "institutional apparatus of the NAFTA
is fairly small and inter-governmental in nature.' Latin America and the Caribbean in the
World Economy, supra note 27, at 40.
44. Steinfatt, supra note 29, at 27.
45. Id. at 28.
46. Id.
47. Foreign Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean, supra note 29, at 38. The U.N. points
out that:
the presence and operation of many [multinational corporationsi in the country [ie., Mexico] today
is... in great measure a result of the integration schemes established with the rest of the subregion,
especially in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with the United States... [The]
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It is the lure of investment rewards that has been the ultimate catalyst for investor-
state disputes and will be of focus in the next section of this paper.
III. Investor-State Dispute Resolution Mechanisms
A. COMMON MARKET OF THE SOUTH
In the area of investment disputes MERCOSUR has created, as one author notes, an
"excellent system which will ensure free competition in the region."5 Under the Protocol
of Colonia for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments in MERCOSUR
("Protocol of Colonia"), signed 17 January 1994,5' and the Protocol on Promotion and
Protection of Investments Coming from Non-MERCOSUR State Parties ("Protocol of
Buenos Aires"), of 5 August 199452 both inter-regional and third state investors acquire
access to the regime's dispute settlement mechanisms.
5 3
The preamble to the Protocol of Colonia recognizes the mutually beneficial contri-
bution investment provides to the overall well being and functioning of MERCOSUR.
5 4
50. Row at supra note 14, at 102. The author of this paper believes that this statement may be
somewhat overly optimistic.
51. The Protocol of Colonia for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments in MER-
COSUR, Jan. 17, 1994, [hereinafter Protocol of Colonial, available at http://www.cvm.gov.br/
ingl/inter/mercosul/coloni-e.asp (last visited Feb. 7, 2002).
52. The Protocol on Promotion of Investments Coming from Non-MERCOSUR State Parties,
Aug. 5, 1994, [hereinafter Protocol of Buenos Aires], available at http://www.sice.oas.org/
trade/mrcsrs/decisions/an1194e.asp (last visited Feb. 7, 2002).
53. "Intra-MERCOSUR foreign investment is governed by the Protocol of Colonia... Non-
member country investment is controlled by the Protocol on Foreign Investment [Protocol
of Buenos Aires]" David M. Gilmore, Free Trade Area of the Americas: Is it Desirable? 31
U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 383, 400-01 (2000).
54. The Protocol of Colonia, supra note 51, preamble. The Protocol states:
Convinced that the creation of favorable conditions for the investment of investors of one of
the Contractor parties in the territory of another Contracting Party will intensify the economic
cooperation, and will speed up the process of integration between the four countries; Recognizing
that the promotion and protection of such investments based on an agreement will contribute to
stimulate the individual economic initiative and will increase the prosperity in the four States.
Articles I and 2 provide definitions of "investment" and "investors;' respectively. The Protocol
goes on to prescribe that investments from others members states be afforded treatment "not
less favorable" than those investments from domestic or third state investors (arts. 2 & 3).
The Protocol also prohibits performance requirements (art. 3(4)), allows for compensation
in cases of expropriation (art. 4), guarantees the repatriation and transfer of monies (art. 5),
and reaffirms the dispute resolution system under the auspices of the Protocol of Brasilia for
state-to-state disputes (art. 8). See also Salazar-Xirinachs, supra note 4, at 80.
In regards to national treatment, the member states asserted numerous exceptions. Sectors
include real estate in border areas, air transportation, shipbuilding, uranium mining, fish-
ing (Argentina); mineral mining, hydraulic energy, health care, telecommunications, leasing
of rural property, shipping (Brazil); real estate in border areas, telecommunications, elec-
tricity, water and telephone services, postal services, petroleum importation (Paraguay); and
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Intra-regional investor-state disputes are covered under Article 9 of the Protocol.55 Ini-
tially, all controversies between investors of a MERCOSUR party and a MERCOSUR
state itself are to be "settled by friendly consultations.' s6 If negotiations between the
investor and the state have proved fruitless after six months, the investor is afforded
three options.57 The investor may submit his/her claim to (1) the national courts of the
MERCOSUR member where the investment took place; (2) international arbitration; or
electricity, hydrocarbon, atomic energy, railroads, petrochemicals, audiovisual instruments
(Uruguay).
55. Protocol of Colonia, supra note 51, art. 9. As mentioned earlier in this paper, supra note 19,
the Protocol of Brasilia is to be applied in certain aspects of the MERCOSUR investment
dispute settlement systems. Under article 8 of the Protocol of Colonia, controversies arising
between member states relating to the application or interpretation of this agreement, must
submit their claims under the rules of the Protocol of Brasilia.
Under the Protocol of Brasilia, disputes are to be settled amicably through direct negotia-
tions between the states. See Protocol of Brasilia, supra note 19, art. 2. If the dispute is not
settled within fifteen days, id. art. 3(2), the state parties submit their complaints to the Com-
mon Market Group. Id. art. 4(1). If the CMG is unsuccessful in reaching a decision within
thirty days, id. art. 6, the matter is sent to a three-person, id. art. 9(1), arbitration proceed-
ings. Id. art. 7(1). The arbitration panel is then given up to ninety days to enter an award.
Id. art. 20. The arbitration awards are final and nonappealable. Id. art. 21(1). If the losing
state party is not compliant with the panel's decision, the other state parties to the dispute
may implement temporary compensatory measures. Id. art. 22(2); see also Thomas Andrew
O'Keefe, An Assessment of MERCOSUR'S Present Legal Framework and Institutions and How
They Affect MERCOSUR'S Chances of Success, 6 AUT INT'L PRACTICUM 14, 16 (1993).
Under the Protocol of Brasilia, all dispute matters are to be handled on the governmental
level. See Treaty of Asunci6n, supra note 13, Annex III, para. 1; Protocol of Brasilia, supra
note 19, arts. 25-32. However, "in the case of foreign investment claims under the Colonia
Protocol or the Foreign Investment Protocol [Protocol of Buenos Aires], private claimants are
granted direct jus standi before international arbitral tribunals for claims against state par-
ties." Horacio A. Grigera Naon, Symposium: Free Trade Areas: The Challenge and Promise of
Fair vs. Free Trade Panel V Regionalism and the Transfer of Sovereignty, 27 LAW & PoL'Y INT'L
Bus. 1073, 1107 (1996). Under the current Protocols "private parties may... directly submit,
without prior exhaustion of local remedies, foreign investment claims against MERCOSUR
host countries to international arbitral bodies that will make their decisions primarily on the
basis of widely accepted international standards for the protection of foreign investment and
investors.' Id. at 1108.
This is also one of the fundamental features of NAFTA Chapter 11, and its provi-
sions "for individual investors to sue foreign nations directly to enforce the agreements
guarantees... Through investor-state provisions, public international law has become more
private... In general, capital-exporting countries favor investor-state provisions to protect
their citizens from lesser-developed countries' temptation to confiscate foreign assets." Rene
Lettow Lerner, International Pressure to Harmonize: The US Civil Justice System in an Era of
Global Trade, 2001 B.Y.U. L. REV. 229, 233 (2001).
It has been pointed out that the Colonia and Buenos Aires Protocols contain provisions
that may be applied to resolve disputes between private investors and host states similar to
the processes in various bilateral investment treaties. Guira, supra note 28, at 261.
56. Protocol of Colonia, supra note 51, art. 9(1).
57. Id. art. 9(2).
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(3) a future permanent system of controversy resolution with private parties to be estab-
lished under the Treaty of Asunci6n.5 s Regardless of which method the investor selects,
the decision will be definitive. 9 Under article 4 of the Protocol, if the investor is not
content with the decision reached in one of the three systems of resolution, the aggrieved
party may appeal to international arbitration6" either under the Convention on Solution
of Controversies Relative to Investment between National States and Other States (ICSID
Convention) or an ad hoc arbitration court established under the guidelines of arbitra-
tion promulgated by the United Nations Commission for International Commercial Law
(UNCITRAL). 61 Decisions under arbitration then will be deemed final, and the member
state must execute the rulings in accordance with its domestic legislation. 62
Under the Protocol of Buenos Aires, the members of MERCOSUR acknowledge that
a system of generally accepted legal principles is necessary to attract third state investment
58. Id. art. 9(2)(I-III).
59. Id. art. 9(3).
60. Id. art. 9(4).
61. Id. art. 9(4)(a & b). In regards to the ICSID rules, where either the host or home state of the
investment or investor is not an ICSID contracting party, the dispute is subject to the ICSID
Additional Facility Rules. Id. art. 9(4)(a); see also Maryse Robert & Theresa Wetter, Toward
an Investment Agreement in the Americas: Building on the Existing Consensus, in TRADE RULES
IN THE MAKING, supra note 4, at 408-409. Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay are signatories
to the ICSID Convention. Brazil has not acceded to the agreement. ICSID-List of Contracting
Parties, available at www.worldbank.org/icsid/constate/c-states-en.htm (last visited Feb. 15,
2002).
There appears to be a dearth of arbitration referrals to ICSID in regards to investor-
MERCOSUR state dispute settlement. Two proceedings of note involve Argentina, France,
and the United States. However, these cases do not involve MERCOSUR instruments (i.e.,
Protocol of Buenos Aires), but prior bilateral investment treaties. See Compafhia de Aguas
del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal v. Argentina Republic (Case No. ARB/97/3), 40
I.L.M. 426(2001) [Argentina-France BIT] and Lanco Int'l, Inc. v. Argentine Republic (Case
No. ARB/97/6), 40 I.L.M. 457(2001) [Argentina-U.S. BIT].
In general, it has been noted that, as an aggregate, the dispute settlement system under
MERCOSUR has been rarely used. "The group has not agreed on common policies on matters
ranging from customs codes to competition policy and investment subsidies; most disputes
are still settled by presidential intervention rather than agreed rules.' Some Realism for MER-
COSUR: Better a Genuine Free-Trade Area Than a Phoney Customs Union, THE ECONOMIST,
31 Mar. 2001, 2001 WL 7318346; Under the investment dispute regimes, ad hoc arbitration
panels may be constituted. However,
[iln practice, disputes have been settled politically by the MERCOSUR presidents themselves. [Until
recently] this system has worked: to safeguard the whole project the presidents have been prepared
to compromise, and when need be, rewrite the rules. But this carries a cost in reducing certainty.
Until a tested and politically-neutral dispute-settlement mechanism is in place, investors thinking of
setting up, say in Uruguay, cannot be certain of guaranteed and barrier-free access to the Brazilian
market.
A Survey of MERCOSUR: The Road to a Single Market-MERCOSUR
Needs Less Red Tape But More Common Rules, 12 Oct. 1996, 1996 WL 11247185.
62. Protocol of Colonia, supra note 51, art. 9(6).
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and protect the interests of investors from these countries.63 In general, "it operates in
substantially the same manner as the Protocol of Colonia."64 Like the Protocol of Colonia,
the Protocol of Buenos Aires adheres to the principles of fair and equitable treatment,
65
national treatment,66 most-favored-nation treatment, 67 free transfer of monies,68 and
compensation for expropriation.
69
In sum, the MERCOSUR investor-state dispute settlement system is fairly simple, at
least relative to the bloc's North American counterpart. It remains shallow after a decade
in existence. It has been noted that MERCOSUR is "not as sophisticated and complex in
the articulation of rules to cover specific situations, as in the NAFTA model."7° The final
section of this paper examines the argument that the current investor-state dispute reso-
lution framework under MERCOSUR remains woefully inadequate, and that attempts to
radically restructure the current system are necessary to avoid upsetting of the delicate
balance of interests present in the Southern Cone.
B. NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
Unlike the Protocol of Buenos Aires, designed to protect investments of states out-
side of MERCOSUR,71 NAFTA promulgates rules, under its Chapter 11, to protect only
63. Protocol of Buenos Aires, supra note 52, preamble.
64. Gilmore, supra note 53, at 401. One major difference, is that upon the unsuccessful resolution
of an investment dispute to be settled amicably, the aggrieved investor has six months to
submit the claim to either arbitration or a national court. Protocol of Colonia, supra note 51,
art. 9(2). The Protocol of Buenos Aires prescribes the amicable negotiation-arbitration court
process only "within a reasonable period of time.' Protocol of Buenos Aires, supra note 52,
art. 2(H)(2).
65. Protocol of Buenos Aires, supra note 52, art. 2(C)(1).
66. Id. art. 2(C)(2).
67. Id. An exception to this principle is contained in art. 2(C)(3). "The State, Parties shall not
extend to investors from Third States, the benefits of any treatment, preference, or privilege,
resulting from: (a) their participation or association in a free trade area, customs union,
common market, or similar regional agreement; (b) an international agreement totally or
partially related to tax matters.'
68. Id. art. 2(E).
69. Id. art. 2(D).
70. Guira, supra note 28, at 257.
Thus far, MERCOSUL [the Portuguese acronym for the Common Market of the South] has opted
for an integration model with supranational institutions. This has been a critical failure, particularly
because a permanent court along the lines of the European Court of Justice is sorely needed. Only
a supranational tribunal can resolve the two fundamental questions for full implementation of the
Treaty of Asunci6n: control of the legality of the acts of the communitarian bodies and Member
States, and the uniform interpretation of Community Law.
de Araujo, supra note 19, at 35.
71. See text supra note 55. To an extent, the Protocol of Buenos Aires on investment in MERCO-
SUR acts as a universal "bilateral treaty" by permitting third state investors facilitated access
to remedies in national courts or international arbitral panels.
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those investors of enterprises from Canada, Mexico, and the United States.7 2 Chapter
11 provides a "comprehensive series of rights" for investors of one NAFTA signatory
investing in the territory of another signatory.73 These rights include national treat-
ment, 74 most- favored-nation treatment,75 protection from performance requirements,
76
free transfer of funds, 77 and protection from governmental takings. 78 Actions of national,
state, provincial, and local governments are valid bases for the assertion of claims under
the Chapter 11 investment protection rules.
79
Once a dispute has arisen, the investor and host state must attempt to settle the
claim through consultations or negotiation.8" If this process proves unsuccessful within
the three-year limitations period,8 the aggrieved investor must deliver an intention to
submit a claim to arbitration at least ninety days prior to the submission. 2 At the
discretion of the investor, the claim may be governed under: (1) the ICSID Convention,
provided that both the NAFTA state investor and the NAFTA host state are parties to
72. NAFTA, supra note 31, at Ch. 11. Chapter 11 of NAFTA refers to the protection of investments
from "investoris] of a Party" and claims submitted on behalf of either the investor, id. art.
1116, or on behalf of the enterprise, id. art. 1117. Under NAFTA, to be considered an "investor
of a Party" an enterprise must be organized under the laws of Canada, Mexico, or the United
States. Robert, supra note 31, at 193. NAFTA has no requirement that the enterprise be
controlled by nationals of a NAFTA signatory state. Id. In contrast, "civil law countries have
traditionally relied. . . on the place where the management or seat of the company is located.
The two MERCOSUR protocols on investment have elected that criterion" Id. at 194. See
also Grigera Naon, supra note 55, at 1155. Under NAFTA Chapter 11, "if a company is
controlled by non-member investors, and does not carry on substantial business activities in
the member country of incorporation, it is not considered a national investor of a member
country."
Section B of Chapter 11 deals specifically with the "settlement of disputes between a
party and an investor of another party?' Article 1115 states that "this subchapter establishes
a mechanism for the settlement of investment disputes that assures both equal treatment
among investors of the Parties in accordance with the principle of international reciprocity
and due process before an impartial tribunal."
73. David A. Gantz, Potential Conflicts between Investor Rights and Environmental Regulation under
NAFTA's Chapter 11, 33 GEo. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 651, 652 (2001).
74. NAFTA, supra note 31, art. 1102.
75. Id. art. 1103. Article 1104 states that all NAFTA members must give investors the better of
the treatments required under articles 1102 and 1103.
76. Id. art. 1106.
77. Id. art. 1109.
78. Id. art. 1110. This article includes expropriation, nationalization, and measures "tantamount
to nationalization or expropriation" of an investment.
79. Lucien Dhooge, The Revenge of the Trail Smelter: Environmental Regulation as Expropriation
Pursuant to the North American Free Trade Agreement, 38 AM. Bus. L.J. 475, 487 (2001). "The
national governments of the parties are charged with responsibility for assuring implementa-
tion of NAFTA's provisions, and are accountable in the event they are unable to secure state
or provincial compliance." Id.
80. NAFTA, supra note 31, art. 1118.
81. Id. art. 1116(2); Id. art. 1117(2).
82. Id. art. 1119. Additionally, a six month period must elapse between the time the event giving
rise to a claim occurred and submission of the claim. Id. art. 1120(1).
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the Convention; (2) the Additional Facility Rules of ICSID, provided that either the
investor or the host state, but not both, is a party to the ICSID Convention, or (3)
the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. 3 Once an arbitration claim has been submitted, the
investor party waives its right to obtain a remedy under the court system of the NAFTA
state involved in the claim, unless for injunctive, declaratory, or other, nonmonetary
related relief.8 4
Once submitted to arbitration, the disputing parties must select the panel, or Tri-
bunal, which shall consist of three arbitrators, one selected by each party, and the third,
known as the presiding arbitrator, appointed by agreement of the parties.8" If, after ninety
days of the claim submission, the Tribunal has not yet been assembled, the Secretary-
General will intervene and appoint the appropriate arbitrators from a roster of forty-five
arbitrators established by a consensus of the NAFTA states.8 6 Once the Tribunal has
reached a final decision, the body may award only monetary damages, any applicable
interest, and restitution of property." Punitive damages shall not be awarded. 8 The
unsuccessful party must comply with the decision of the Tribunal without delay.8 9 Each
83. Id. art. 1120. Currently, of the three NAFTA member states, only the United States is a
signatory to the ICSID Convention. ICSID-List of Contracting Parties, supra note 61.
84. NAFTA, supra note 31, art. 1121(1) & (2). One claim of note focused upon the Tribunal's
interpretation of the article 1121 waiver provisions. In Waste Management, Inc. v. United
Mexican States, the claimant, a U.S. waste disposal company, filed a dispute under the ICSID
Additional Facility Rules against the State of Guerrero and the municipality of Acapulco for
breaches of articles 1105 and 1110. ARB(AF)/98/2, 40 I.L.M. 56 (2001), available at www.state.
gov/s/l/c3753.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2002). Waste Management filed a waiver to bring
the claim to a NAFTA Tribunal. However, once the waiver was filed, Waste Management's
subsidiary pursued further related claims against Acapulco under Mexican law. The Tribunal
held that the claimant's waiver was inadequate, and that the panel lacked jurisdiction in this
matter. See id. §31 of the arbitral award of 2 June 2000. For further analysis of this case,
see Bernard Oxman & William Dodge, Arbitration-NAFTA-urisdiction-Waiver of Right
to Initiate or Continue Other Legal Proceedings-Effect of Pursuing Municipal Law Claims in
Municipal Court, 95 Am. J. INT'L L. 186 (2001).
Under NAFTA article 1121, a claimant waives his or her right to "initiate or continue
before any administrative tribunal or court under the law of any Party,... any proceedings
with respect to the measure of the disputing Party that is alleged to be a breach" of a NAFTA
obligation. "In short, the Article 1121 waiver protects against claimants 'double-dipping' and
maintaining cases in two different forums simultaneously, with respect to the same measures
that allegedly caused them injuries." Jacob S. Lee, No "Double-Dipping" Allowed: An Analysis
of Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States and the Article 1121 Waiver Requirement
for Arbitration under Chapter 11 of NAFTA, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2655, 2657 (2001).
85. NAFTA, supra note 31, art. 1123.
86. Id. arts. 1124(2), (3).
87. Id. art. 1135(1). Tribunal decisions are reached by simple majority. ICSID Rules, art. 25,
available at www.worldbank.org/facility/33/htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2002). Also, panel awards
have no precedential force (i.e., they are binding only between the disputing parties). NAFTA,
supra note 31, art. 1136(1).
88. Id. art. 1135(3).
89. Id. art. 1136(2). This rule is tempered by article 1135(3). Under this section, the prevailing
party must wait: (i) 120 days, or (ii) after revision or annulment proceedings have been com-
pleted if the award was made under the ICSID Convention. If the award was granted under
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state party is obligated to provide for the enforcement of Tribunal awards in its individual
territory.9" If this party fails to comply, the government of the investor may request the
Commission to establish a panel under the rules of Chapter 20.9' Under the provisions
of Chapter 20, the noncompliant party may face suspension of NAFTA benefits.9 2
As the NAFTA regime evolves, the investment protection provisions under its
Chapter 11 will "become most significant in terms of conflicts between free trade
and investment flows, and other governmental objectives, such as protection of the
environment."93
As noted earlier, available investor-state dispute resolution mechanisms under MER-
COSUR appear to rarely have been employed to their fullest. In contrast, recent years
have "witnessed an increase in the frequency and importance" of NAFTA investor-state
claims, particularly involving American investors against Canada and Mexico, and Cana-
dian claims against the United States.94 This increase is evident of the rules in Chapter 11,
the ICSID Additional Facility Rules or the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, the prevailing party
must: (i) wait three months after the rendering of the award, and no party has commenced
a proceeding to revise, set aside, or annul the award, or (ii) a court has dismissed or allowed
a request to revise, set side, or annul the award and there is no further appeal pending.
90. Id. art. 1136(2).
91. Id. art. 1135(6).
92. Id. art. 2019.
93. Gantz, supra note 73, at 652.
Protection of investment is an integral part of NAFTA. lit has been] noted: Trade and investment
flows are interdependent. To achieve the benefits of economic liberalization, investment barriers
must be addressed as comprehensively as trade barriers. Hence, a chapter on investment was an
essential element of an agreement that was to provide the basis for hemispheric free trade.
Id.
94. Todd Weiler, Foreign Investment in the United States, 35 INT'L LAW. 363, 363 (2001).
As of 19 February 2002, at least thirteen NAFTA investor-state arbitrations have either
concluded or are still pending. See United States Department of State website, at
www.state.gov/s/l/c3439.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2002). In many of the Chapter 11 actions
brought, environmental regulatory issues have been involved to some degree. Gantz, supra
note 73, at 659.
Some cases of note include Azinian v. United Mexican States, the first case decided on the
merits by a NAFTA tribunal. Id. at 702; case report available at www.state.gov/s/I/c3750.htm
(last visited Aug. 15, 2002). In this case, an American investor claimed that the City of Nau-
calpan terminated its landfill and waste management operation contract without cause. The
Tribunaf found in favor of Mexico in a case that "demonstrated neither arbitrary government
action nor discrimination against foreign investors nor any factual evidence of an expropri-
ation." Id.
In Ethyl Corp. v. Government of Canada, a panel created under Canada's Agreement on
Internal Trade found that Canada's ban on gasoline imports containing an additive called
MMT created an unfair trade environment. 38 I.L.M. 708 (1999); case report available at
www.state.gov/s/l/c3745.htm (last visited Aug. 15, 2002). In exchange for withdrawal of its
Tribunal claim, Ethyl received $13 million from Canada. The importation ban was soon
thereafter removed by the Canadian government.
The classic "not-in-my-backyard" argument, David A. Gantz, Reconciling Environmental
Protection and Investor Rights Under Chapter 11 of NAFTA, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10646 (2001)
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which are aimed to "ease and facilitate investment by being clearly workable and pre-
dictable for all interested parties ... Enhancing investors' ability to recover for breaches
of Chapter 11 is often treated as the unwritten subtext of the goals set forth in Article
102 of Chapter One "'95
However, while both investors and lawyers appreciate the institutional depth and
structure of Chapter 11, the question is at what cost to national sovereignty. The final
section of this paper will conclude that, while the investment dispute settlement sys-
tem under NAFTA far exceeds the capabilities of MERCOSUR at this time, the for-
mer regime must exercise greater caution in weighing environmental concerns and
sovereignty against the desirable input of foreign investment.
came to the fore in Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States. In this case, an American
investor contracted to open and operate a hazardous waste facility in the state of San Luis
Potosi. Soon thereafter, the governor of the state declared the landfill site to be a protected
zone for rare cacti. The NAFTA Tribunal awarded Metalclad $16.7 million, some of which was
set aside. CSID Case No. ARB(AB)/97/1; case report available at www.state.gov/s/l/c3752.htm
(last visited Aug. 15, 2002).
This case marked the first time one of the NAFTA member states lost a case brought against
it under the Chapter 11 investor-state dispute resolution mechanism. See Lucien Dhooge, The
North American Free Trade Agreement and the Environment: The Lessons of Metalclad Cor-
poration v. United Mexican States, 10 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 209, 213 (2001). For further
analysis of this case and the "firestorm of criticism" from environmentalists that followed. Id.
In S.D. Meyers v. Government of Canada, an Ohio corporation filed claims alleging a
taking of property rights by Canada. Case report available at www.state.gov/s/l/c3746.htm
(last visited Aug. 15, 2002). The claimant had a polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) processing
plant in Ohio. Canada had in place a law banning exports of PCB to the United States (for
disposal), in effect protecting Canada's only PCB treatment plant in Swan Hills, Alberta. The
arbitrators found that Canada violated the national treatment and minimum standards of
treatment provisions of NAFTA. For in-depth analysis of this case, see Brian Trevor Hodges,
Where the Grass is Always Greener: Foreign Investor Actions Against Environmental Regulations
under NAFTA's Chapter 11: S.D. Meyers, Inc. v. Canada, 14 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 367
(2001).
In Methanex Corp. v. United States, the Canadian investor, a manufacturer of methanol,
alleges injuries suffered due to California's ban on the use of a gasoline additive known as
MTBE. Case report available at www.state.gov/s/l/c5818 (last visited Aug. 17, 2002). Methanol
is a key ingredient of MTBE. Methanex contends that the ban violates the fair and equitable
treatment, national treatment, and expropriation provisions of NAFTA. As such, Methanex
claims damages of $1 billion. The case is still pending.
Like the Metalclad case, Methanex's claims have been decried by environmental con-
cerns. Several environmental groups, including Greenpeace and the Sierra Club have
"called upon NAFTA's Free Trade Commission to suspend proceedings challenging envi-
ronmental protections ... until such time as the contracting parities clarify the relation
of environmental laws to NAFTAs investor-state provisions.' Dhooge, supra note 79, at
479. All claims and arbitration decisions adjudicated under Chapter 11 are available at
http://www.state.gov/s/l/c3439.htm.
95. Andrea Bjorklund, Contract without Privity: Sovereign Offer and Investor Acceptance, 2 Cm. 1.
INT'L L. 183, 183 (2001). Of course, NAFTA Chapter 11 protections "need not, and should
not, be read to mean that any NAFTA investor can recoup the losses it suffered in any
investment deal gone awry" Id. at 186.
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IV. Conclusion
In regards to NAFTA, recent years have produced a trickle of claims, which began
in the late 1990s, and are "now resulting in a slow but steady stream of substantive and
procedural case law that promises to contribute substantially to international economic
law in generil[.]"96 While this inevitably produces a rich legal framework from which
to draw, Chapter 11 has the potential to evolve into an "out of control monster," cre-
ating an overwhelming influx of litigation and frivolous claims.97 This increase has the
potential of opening floodgates, swamping the arbitration mechanism, and creating a
system of economic compensation for alleged wrongs, while simultaneously and tacitly
promoting environmental degradation. 9 This concern seems more legitimate in light of
the Metalclad and Methanex cases.
Overall, however, NAFTA has rapidly evolved into probably the most overwhelm-
ingly successful regional arrangement. One element of this success and attractiveness has
been its reliable investor-state dispute resolution system. Allowing individuals to directly
approach governments and seek redress is fundamental to the democratic expectations
of the NAFTA countries, and indicates a greater evolution towards privatization of inter-
national law. While the current system surely requires some revision, at the current time,
the feared juggernaut of litigation has not yet occurred. As alluded to earlier, the nexus
of expropriation-environmental concerns pervades any mention of Chapter 11 refor-
mation. While Metalclad and Methanex could produce disconcerting, if not outrageous
results, governments and investors must exercise restraint to avoid the risk of judicial
harassment and rampant corporate greed.
For MERCOSUR and its investor-state system, the situation is dramatically differ-
ent. Recent economic and political problems in the leaders of MERCOSUR, Argentina
and Brazil, will only exacerbate the situation. MERCOSUR was created to promote trade
harmonization. However, trade and investment are elegantly intertwined. While the Pro-
tocols of Colonia and Buenos Aires provide a progressive framework and "incorporate
96. Weiler, supra note 94, at 373.
97. Daniel M. Price, NAFTA Chapter 11-Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Frankenstein or Safety
Valve, 26 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 107, S9 (2001). Mr. Price points out that predictions about misuse
of Chapter 11 remain premature due to the small amount of decisions handed down. Id.
98. NAFTA, supra note 31, art. 1114.1:
nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining or
enforcing any measure, otherwise consistent with this Chapter, that it considers appropriate to
ensure that investment activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental
concerns.
However, the drafting "leaves something to be desired... In the event of a conflict between
Article 1114:1 and Article 1110:1, is the 'any measure otherwise consistent with this Chapter'
language in Article 1114:1 designed ... to subordinate Article 1114(a) to Article I 110:1, or
is it hopelessly circular?" See Gantz, supra note 73, at 679-680.
One should note that while the objectives of NAFTA article 102 specifically refer to the
desire to "increase substantially investment in the territories of the Parties" NAFTA, supra
note 31, art. 102(1)(c), no mention of protection of the environment is made. Gantz, supra
note 73, at 680.
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comprehensive investment disciplines"'99 the complete MERCOSUR system could pro-
duce apprehension to prospective investors. The overall MERCOSUR system has been
designed to reflect its objective of "economic integration thorough political cooperation
rather than institutionalism."'00 However, without greater commitment by the MERCO-
SUR states to implement rules, in particular investor-state resolution provisions, investor
confidence will inevitably decline. This ambivalence is exemplified by the fact that both
the Colonia and Buenos Aires Protocols have not yet entered into force.'' This is because
the national legislatures of the signatory states have not fully integrated these agreements
into their juridical systems. In contrast, the NAFTA system is relatively comprehensive
and at full implementation. While daunting, its repletion and predictability provides
reliability and confidence.
In conclusion, hemispheric integration has come to the fore in recent years as
progress, albeit incremental, towards a more expansive free trade system, or Free Trade
Area of the Americas, has occurred. Once successfully established, investment rules will
prove dominant and "investor-state dispute settlement will be essential to ensuring the
effectiveness of those rules."' 2
99. Robert & Wetter, supra note 61, at 390.
100. Taylor, supra note 3, at 867-68.
101. Salazar-Xirinachs, supra note 4, at 81; see also text, supra note 24.
102. Price, supra note 97, at S9.

